

AN OBSERVATION TOUR REPORT

A Report on Findings of the Observation on Peace Process of The Republic of The Philippines and Timor-Leste

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2010

A Report on Observation Tour of the Republic of Philippines and Timor-Leste

(Feb 6, 2010 – Feb 16, 2010)

1. Background

An official delegation of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) headed by its Secretary Mr. Punya Prasad Neupane visited the Republic of Philippines and Timor-Leste in the first and second week of February 2010. The eleven-day observation tour that started on February 6, 2010 comprised of seven other officials from the Ministry. The main purpose of the visit was to learn about the peace processes, mechanisms, structures, and activities of these post conflict countries through field observations and interactions with the government officials, security officers, rebels, local communities, civil society organizations, and INGOs and donors representatives. During the visit, the delegation also shared Nepal's own experiences with concerned officials. The team spent five days in Philippines and four days in Timor-Leste before returning back to Kathmandu on February 16, 2010.

In Philippines, the delegation focused on the aspects such as underlying causes and history of conflict, peace processes and peace negotiations, mechanisms for monitoring of ongoing ceasefire agreement between the government and rebels, special programs launched by the government for promoting peace, reintegration of rebels in the national security forces, media campaigns, peace structures at the central and local levels, engagement of civil society organizations in the peace process including youths, and rehabilitation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). For acquiring in-depth understanding about these aspects the delegation visited IDP camps in Mindanao and interacted with local communities and high level representatives of the national army and rebels.

In Timor-Leste, the delegation focused mainly in the areas of transitional justice and civil society engagement in peace processes. The delegation interacted with the ex-commissioners of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to gain insights about the TRC process. Meetings with the honorable Vice Prime Minister and the members of parliament were useful in understanding the country's plan to implement TRC recommendations which are yet due. Similarly, interaction with the NGOs and Peace Building Working Group was helpful in understanding the engagement of civil society organizations in the peace process of Timor-Leste.

The delegation was enriched significantly by learning about different facets of peace processes in these post conflict countries- about what worked and what did not, about what are working and what are not. While duly acknowledging the fact that there can be as many peace processes as there can be causes of conflicts, the delegation strongly felt that Nepal can learn a lot from the experiences of Philippines and Timor-Leste. This report is prepared to document the delegation’s visit to these countries including lessons learnt in the process.

The Asia Foundation (TAF) in Nepal, Philippines, and Timor-Leste facilitated the observation tour by arranging meetings with relevant persons and organizations and planning for local travel arrangements. The delegation hence extends its sincere thanks to the TAF team in these countries and the officials and representatives who provided their valuable time to share their views and experiences openly and welcomingly.

2. Objectives of the Observation Tour

- i) To learn about the peace processes, mechanisms, structures, and activities of Philippines and Timor-Leste through field observations and interactions with the government officials, security officers, rebels, local communities, civil society organizations, and INGOs and donors representatives.
- ii) To collect and compile experiences from these countries and document and disseminate the lessons learnt to the MoPR’s officials and relevant stakeholders.
- iii) To enhance the capacity of MoPR so that it can contribute more effectively and efficiently in Nepal’s peace processes.
- iv) To share Nepal’s peace processes with the officials of the Philippines and Timor-Leste.

3. Meetings and Proceedings

3.1 The Republic of Philippines

Date	Personnel/Place	Key Issues Discussed
Feb 7, 2010	Dr. Steven Rood, Country Director, TAF-Philippines Somerset Millennium Hotel, Makati	In his de-briefing, Dr. Rood informed the delegation about the political history of Philippines; causes, actors, and history of conflict in the country; and the ongoing peace processes and challenges. The followings were highlighted: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Philippines archipelago consists of more than 7000 islands with a vast diversity in terms of culture, religion, and language. In a country so diverse and dispersed the causes of conflict are multidimensional and hence complex. • The rebel groups can be broadly divided into two categories- i) those motivated by the reasons related to religion and ethnicity, and ii) those motivated by the reasons related to poverty and inequality.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the first category fall three groups viz, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The MNLF, which emerged in 1970 with a demand for separate Islamic nation in Southern Philippines, signed a peace agreement with Manila in 1996 that created the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). MILF was formed in 1977 after splitting from MNLF and fought with Manila for “Bangsamoro,” the Muslim Nation. At the moment a ceasefire agreement has been signed between the Government of Republic of Philippines (GRP) and MILF and the negotiations are ongoing. Abu Sayyaf is the smallest, most active and most violent Islamic separatist group in the southern Philippines. It emerged in 1991 as a splinter group of the MNLF. Abu Sayyaf engages in kidnappings, bombings, assassinations and extortion from businesses and wealthy businessmen and is treated by the GRP as a terrorist group. • In the second category falls New People’s Army (NPA), the military wing of the Communist People's Party of the Philippines (CPP). It was founded in 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the Philippines government through guerrilla warfare and is mostly concentrated in rural areas of northern Philippines. The peace talk with NPA was stalled in June 2001. • Philippines has adopted ‘six paths to peace’ policy to address the conflict which includes social, economic and political reforms; peaceful negotiated settlements with armed groups; building consensus and empowerment for peace; programs for reconciliation and reintegration; addressing concerns that arise out of the continuing armed hostilities, and nurturing positive climate for peace. • Several peace initiatives and peace talks have been conducted with rebel groups-particularly the NPA and the MILF- since 1993 when the Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP) was established. • Peace talks with the MNLF dates back to 1976 Tripoli Agreement, which resulted in the formation of Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In 1996, GRP-MNLF Accord was signed popularly known as the Final Peace Agreement (FPA), which is yet to be fully implemented. Last formal agreement between the GRP and NPA was signed in 1998 as “Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law” (CAHRIL). The NPA is still active throughout the Philippines while the peace talks have stalled since 2001. The ongoing peace process with the MILF
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		<p>includes several agreements such as “Agreement for General Cessation of Hostilities, 2001”, Implementing Guidelines of the Security Aspects of Tripoli Peace Agreement, 2001”, “Implementation Guidelines of the Humanitarian, rehabilitation and Development Aspects of Tripoli Peace Agreement, 2002”, “Operational Guidelines of the Ad Hoc Joint Action group (AHJAG), 2004”.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of peace agreements has been challenging. Weak political parties (since most of the politics in the country is family business), and highly politicized bureaucracy are the great challenges in furthering the peace agenda and sustaining the peace process in Philippines which is so diverse and dispersed.
Feb 8, 2010	Secretary Annabelle Abaya / Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Manila	<p>The meeting with Secretary of OPAPP was quite useful in understanding the GRP’s policies, strategies and programs in relation to the ongoing peace processes in Philippines. The followings were highlighted and discussed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It was informed that the GRP is implementing special programs for the rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas. Kalaayan Barangays Program and Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Program are launched at local level as peace and development initiatives. Similarly, Peace and Development Communities are formed to engage the former MNLF rebels in Mindanao. • Social Integration Program is primarily targeted for the communist rebels. This package program includes protection of rebels, training, providing relief of 50,000 pesos to the rebel for livelihoods and 15,000 pesos for surrendering gun. The Secretary highlighted that providing direct cash to rebels was not effective for their reintegration into the society. The GPR is now planning to change the strategy and lend money to rebels against the government collateral. The rebels will have to spend the loan so received through cooperatives to be formed at community level. While the rebels will receive a loan of 50,000 pesos the community will receive 15,000 pesos. This, OPAPP believes, will help reintegrate the rebels more effectively since the rebels and community people will have to work together as common stakeholders of the cooperatives so formed. • The OPAPP is also facilitating involvement of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the peace process. Peace Partners Forums are held 2-3 times each year. The Secretary of the OPAPP was of the opinion that CSOs could be more cost effective in launching peace campaigns and programs.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OPAPP has also given top priority to the Media Campaign and believes that dialogues could be the best means for reducing the conflict. For this media campaigns have been launched using written, audio and visual formats. The new focus of OPAPP is on the Reflective Dialogue involving more and more talks at the community level. NGOs will operate this program. • The OPAPP is also launching Reconciliation Program. The thrust is on providing spaces for rebels at the community level for story-telling and ensuring two way process of communication between rebels and the community so that rebels can better integrate into the community.
Feb 8, 2010	Alma Evangelista Conflict Adviser (UNDP/Philippines)	Meeting with UNDP Conflict Adviser was useful in understanding the UNDP supported ACT for Peace Program . This program has helped to form 278 Peace and Development Communities (PDCs) to engage the former MNLF rebels. The young volunteers in the communities serve as Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs).
Feb 9, 2010	Atty. Soliman Santos Santos Restaurant	<p>Briefing about the history of conflict in Philippines, Attorney Soliman provided an overview of different formal and informal peace structures working at the grassroots. The followings were elaborated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace and Development Communities (PDCs): are formed only in MNLF areas for engaging former MNLF rebels. The PDCs are involved in peace building in their communities. • Local Peace and Order Council: are very much related to the local government structures and bodies. These councils are used for counterinsurgency rather than peace building. • Peace Zones: are informal local peace structures initiated by the local communities. The communities declare their area as peace zones during insurgency and request both the army and rebels not to use their defined area as battlefield. Sometimes such requests are respected and sometimes not. The Peace zones are mainly confined in MILF areas. But some Peace Zones are formed in MNLF and NPA affected areas as well. <p>Atty. Santos also informed that Maoists in Philippines do not like local peace structures. They think that such structures are counterinsurgency tactic to diffuse the communist movement.</p> <p>He also highlighted that peace processes should not only focus on larger structural issues such as rights for autonomy or power sharing between center and province. These should equally focus on people to people and community to community relationships. There should be balance between centralized/national and local</p>

		<p>peace processes. Such balance could be achieved through the provision of local level peace structures.</p>
Feb 9, 2010	<p>Karen Tanada, Executive Director, Gastron Ortigas Peace Institute (GOPI)</p>	<p>The meeting was quite useful in understanding civic engagement in Philippines peace process. This NGO was established in 1991 and has been conducting several peace initiatives since then. It has published several books, journals, documentaries related to Philippines peace process. The delegation got an opportunity to watch documentary prepared by youths calling for sustainable peace in the country.</p> <p>GOPI has been supporting Peace Weavers (networks of NGOs) for furthering citizens' peace agenda: food, freedom, jobs, and justice.</p> <p>The meeting was also attended by Professor Ed Garcia of International Alert, who had in-depth knowledge about Nepal's peace process. He highlighted the importance of writing constitution in time and stressed on the need for sustaining peace initiatives through Peace Ambassadors having following qualities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Moral courage/moral imagination ➤ Marathon mentality ➤ Habits of dialogue (capacity to listen)
Feb 10, 2010	<p>IDP meeting in Talayan</p>	<p>The delegation had an opportunity to visit Mindanao and seek first hand information about the ongoing peace process in southern Philippines. A meeting with IDPs was arranged in Talayan Municipality in one of the IDP camps. The followings were observed and discussed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are about half a million IDPs in Philippines who are locally known as "BAKWITS". • Thousands of IDPs are settled in IDP camps supported by the government and donors. The major donors include IOM, UNICEF, ICRC, WFP, JICA, CFSI. The government funding is not regular and is insufficient to run the camps. The donor funding is channeled through partner NGOs. • Infrastructures in the IDP camps are temporary and susceptible to damage during natural calamities. The general living condition in these camps was poor. • Even after the ceasefire, many IDPs do not feel safe to return home. Some of them go to their homes for sometimes but return back to the camps in fear of hostilities. • IDP management has hence become a very challenging task in Philippines.

Feb-10, 2010	Meeting and Interaction with Bantay Ceasefire Volunteers	<p>The delegation thereafter held group discussions with Mindanao Peoples' Caucus (MPC) which is a NGO established with the participation of Christians, indigenous people, and Moros. The MPC launch MPC program through Bantay Ceasefire Volunteers which is about 600 in number. The job of the volunteers is to monitor the ceasefire agreement signed between MILF and GRP. The young volunteers launch human rights and development activities. They provide skills enhancement training in different trades such as leadership development, carpentry, masonry etc. They are also involved in infrastructure works such as child-friendly space in schools, small playing areas. They carry out these activities in partnership with the UNICEF. The volunteers are also involved in peace rallies, campaigns and conduct consultations and workshops.</p> <p>Involving youths as volunteers through such mechanism was found effective. The local initiative of this kind was found useful in maintaining peace through community-level response to violent incidents to avoid escalation into larger conflicts.</p>
Feb-10, 2010	MILF Vice President Ghazadi Jaafar	<p>The delegation also had an opportunity to meet with Vice President of MILF, Mr. Ghazadi Jaafar at his official residence in Cotabato. Mr. Jaafar spoke quite frankly with delegation describing the history of conflict in southern Philippines, and ongoing peace process. He stressed that exploitation by different actors at different times created the conflict which has a history of 488 years. At the moment, the conflict is between MILF and the GRP. He was quite optimistic that a peaceful resolution of the conflict will be achieved. However, he also stressed that such resolution should be just and long lasting.</p>
Feb-11-2010	GRP CCCH Meeting Major Carlos	<p>Next morning the delegation met with GRP Coordination Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH). It was learnt that the peace talks between GRP and MILF started from 1997. In 2001 Agreement for general Cessation of Hostilities was signed. Accordingly, institutional mechanism was established for coordination and monitoring of ceasefire agreement. The following mechanism for ceasefire implementation was highlighted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Separate GRP Peace Panel and MILF Peace Panel were formed coordinated by Malaysian Secretariat. • Both GRP and MILF have established Secretariat under their Peace Panels. • Ceasefire coordination is done through Joint CCCH, which is comprised of 7 representatives each from GRP and MILF. The Joint CCCH holds monthly coordination meetings. • Under the Joint CCCH are 13 Local Monitoring Teams

		<p>(LMTs) operating in 13 provinces. The LMTs are responsible for fact finding/inquiry work, and local ceasefire monitoring.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For third party monitoring of ceasefire agreement, there is provision of International Monitoring Team (IMT) with representatives from Malaysia, Brunei, Japan and Libya. The IMT observes implementation of ceasefire. • In addition there is provision of Ad-hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) which is a joint body that operates on the basis of shared information/data. • The statistics revealed that the implementation of ceasefire agreement was characterized by several ups and downs. 2001-2002 was the period of GRP-MILF armed skirmishes while 2004-2005 was characterized by lower level of conflict. Years 2008-2009 were the periods with raised incidences of armed conflict while the year 2010 was quite peaceful.
Feb-11-2010	Meeting with Philippines Military Generals 6 th Infantry Divisions in Cotabato City	<p>This meeting was quite useful in understanding Philippines experience of reintegration of MNLF rebels in the national army. The following information were provided:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After peace agreement with MNLF in 1996, about 5,000 soldiers were integrated in the national army, of which about 500 were integrated at officer rank. • Integration process took a long time of about 4 years. • The rebels were integrated with flexible entry requirement with regards to their experience, age, and education. In case of old rebels, their children were given the opportunity to join the national army. • They had to take specially designed training before placement. For officers the training period was about 1 year while for juniors it was about six months. • The rebels were given entry as individuals, trained in groups and then posted in different provinces. • The problem, however, was that new splinter armed group emerged as MILF. While the peace negotiations with MILF are ongoing, these have not led to their disarmament.

3.2 Timor-Leste

Date	Personnel/Place	Key Issues Discussed
Feb 13, 2010	Mr. Silas Everett Executive Director of TAF, @ Hotel Timor	<p>In his de-briefing, Mr. Silas informed the delegation about the political history of Timor-Leste; causes, actors, and history of conflict in the country; and the ongoing peace processes and challenges. The followings were highlighted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • East Timor as Portuguese colony was occupied by Japan from

		<p>1942-45. Portugal resumed colonial authority over East Timor in 1945 after the Japanese defeat in World War II. Following a military coup in Lisbon in April 1974, Portugal began a rapid and disorganized decolonization process in most of its overseas territories, including East Timor. This led to coup by Timorese Democratic Union party (UDT) in Dili, which was followed by a brief but bloody civil war in which the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) pushed UDT forces into Indonesian West Timor. Shortly after the FRETILIN victory in late September, Indonesian forces began incursions into East Timor. East Timor was under Indonesian occupation since 1976.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On January 27, 1999, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced his government's desire to hold a referendum in which the people of East Timor would chose between autonomy within Indonesia and independence. Under an agreement among the United Nations, Portugal, and Indonesia, the referendum was held on August 30, 1999. When the results were announced on September 4--78% voted for independence. • Timor-Leste became a fully independent republic with a parliamentary form of government on May 20, 2002, following approximately two and a half years under the authority of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The country's first parliament was formed from the 88-member Constituent Assembly chosen in UN-supervised elections in August 2001. The FRETILIN Party won the majority of Assembly seats. Mari Alkatiri, FRETILIN's Secretary General, became the first Prime Minister, and the country's 29-member cabinet was dominated by FRETILIN. Xanana Gusmao was elected on April 14, 2002 as President. • In April 2006, violence again erupted in the Timor-Leste. In response to the escalating unrest, large numbers of people began to flee their homes for internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or the outlying districts. The violence mounted with a series of deadly clashes among the dissident military forces, civilians, and some police occurring on May 23-25. After these clashes civil order collapsed. Gang violence took over the capital, resulting in additional deaths, widespread destruction of property, and the continued displacement of thousands of Dili residents. At the peak of the crisis, there was a national total of about 150,000 IDPs. • On August 25, 2006 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1704, creating the United Nations Integrated
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		<p>Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). UNMIT's mandate was to assist in restoring stability, rebuilding the institutions comprising the security sector, supporting the Government of Timor-Leste in conducting the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, and achieving accountability for the crimes against humanity and other atrocities committed in 1999.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Government of Timor-Leste held parliamentary elections on June 30, 2007. FRETILIN won the highest number of seats in parliament, but no single party won a majority. On August 6, 2007, President Ramos-Horta asked Xanana Gusmao, the leader of a coalition with a majority of the seats in the parliament (the Alliance with a Parliamentary Majority or AMP), to form a government. Gusmao was sworn in as Prime Minister along with most of the other ministers in the new government on August 8, 2007. FRETILIN continues to assert that the government is unconstitutional although it participates actively in the work of the national parliament. • On February 11, 2008 followers of former military police commander and fugitive Alfredo Reinado attacked President Ramos-Horta who sustained gunshot injuries and was airlifted to Darwin, Australia for medical treatment. Prime Minister Gusmao escaped unharmed after his bodyguards thwarted a separate attack against him the same day as the attack on the president. The president's bodyguards killed Reinado. • At the moment, the country is in transition and the peace process is fragile. The main challenges relate to achieving political stability in the country. The party that has largest number of parliamentarians is sitting in the opposition. The peace and security situation is also dependent on UNMIT policing. The political, economic, and social institutions have not yet stabilized and the country needs to engage its ever increasing youth force in productive employment. • Another challenge is to ensure good governance and thrash impunity. The recommendations by the TRC are yet to be implemented leading to gradual frustrations among victims.
Feb 15, 2009	CAVR Executive Director Agostinho dos Vasconcelos and STP Adviser Mr. Pat Walsh	<p>This meeting was quite useful in understanding Timorese experience on the formation of CAVR (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) and the CAVR processes. The following information were provided:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transitional justice was a key component of Timor-Leste's peace building process. There was political consensus regarding the formation of CAVR and hence it was formed very fast, even before the drafting of the constitution by the

		<p>constituent assembly.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CAVR was a state agency but it worked at the grassroots and used community reconciliation as the strategic tool for healing. As such it enjoyed very strong and broad-based support. • The time for CAVR was initially two years. But since the tasks were process oriented requiring consultations at community level, the term was inadequate and extended to four years. • The CAVR was confronted with two major issues: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The first issue was dealing with the atrocities that were not only internal but also external. Violations from Indonesian occupation were external and required support from the Indonesian government for any sort of prosecution, which was a hectic task. A joint commission of Indonesia and Timor-Leste, called CTF, was formed to take care of this issue. However, there was a strong suspicion that non-amnestable crimes would also get amnesty. The CTF report produced jointly acknowledges for bringing justice. However, it provides no recommendation for any trial or amnesty. ➤ The second issue related to the CAVR process was requiring both the amnesty and prosecution to go together, which was quite contradictory. So two types of violations were distinguished: less serious violations and serious violations. While there should be no prosecution for the less serious violations, the serious violations should go through the legal processes. • The CAVR comprised of seven national Commissioners selected through consultative process with representation from civil societies. The final list of the national commissioners was decided by the UN administration. The CAVR then selected regional commissioners based on consultative process. • Community reconciliation process was adopted for which public hearings were conducted at the grassroots. Traditional leaders were involved in the reconciliation process. The idea was to avoid the victorious or state justice and provide space to victims and perpetrators for talks and identify whether the crimes were serious or non serious. For healing linking cultural processes with legal processes was important. • During CAVR period 13,000 statements were collected. The CAVR selected the statements which could be concluded. Such statements have been duly incorporated in the final report.
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Feb 15,2010	Meeting with CAVR Commissioners	<p>The ex-commissioners of CAVR provided in-depth information regarding the CAVR processes and issues. The followings were highlighted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community consultation process requires a lot of time. So adequate time should be allocated for truth and reconciliation. • Clear legal framework for amnesty and prosecution should be in place before CAVR establishment and processes. Otherwise it will be difficult to implement CAVR recommendations. • The process should be victim-centered with adequate resources allocated for reparation. • Proper documentation is a must.
Feb 15, 2010	HE Mario Carascalao Vice Prime Minister of Timor Leste	<p>One of the founders of first political party of East Timor- UDT- His Excellency Mario Carascalao is the Vice Prime Minister of current coalition government. He provided first hand information on the political developments of East Timor since the time of Indonesian occupation and elaborated on the priority of coalition government. The followings were covered:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historically, the UDT wanted gradual independence while the FRETILIN wanted immediate independence. So the positions of UDT and FRETILIN were in confrontation. This created internal conflict in East Timor. • Indonesian occupation of East Timor came to an end through referendum and the UN administration took charge of peace building in East Timor. • While the UN helped restore peace in Timor-Leste it failed to enhance the capacity of Timorese people to run the state institutions and sustain peace. Everything was done in a hurry leading to several events of conflict in the country. • The current parliament has FRETILIN as the largest party. But it lacks enough seats to form the government. So the coalition government of five parties has been formed. FRETILIN views that this government is unconstitutional. This is a major source of political conflict in the country at the moment. • The present government is trying to create large middle class

		<p>in Timor-Leste. The priority of government is to invest in education, create employment for youth population, attract FDIs for promotion of tourism and infrastructures, ensure good governance, and strengthen the judiciary to tackle issues related to emerging culture of impunity in a democratic way.</p>
Feb 16, 2010	Ms. Fernanda Borges President of Committee A and member of National Parliament	<p>Ms. Borges reiterated the history of Timor-Leste including the circumstances under which the CAVR and CTF were formed and the processes that they followed. The meeting was helpful in understanding the issues related to implementation of CAVR recommendations. The followings were highlighted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resolution in the parliament has accepted reports of both the CAVR and CTF. However, there is no institutional mechanism to implement the recommendations. • Committee A under the national parliament is drafting law to form institution and processes for the implementation of CAVR recommendations. • There is a divide among people on how to move forward. Some are of the opinion that the government should only focus on reconciliation while the others want to bring the perpetrators of serious crimes to judicial process. • One of the serious issues with regards to implementation of CAVR and CTF is the timing. What would be appropriate time to implement the recommendation is a matter of discussion. • In case of serious crimes committed by Indonesia, many Timorese are demanding justice instead of full amnesty. This is a matter which can be resolved only through bilateral understandings. <p>Ms. Borges also explained that though the fundamental rights are protected by the constitution, the mechanisms/institutions through which people exercise these rights are very weak. Regarding gender mainstreaming, she highlighted that Timor-Leste has 30 percent women parliamentarians, but quotas alone are not sufficient and there is need for women empowerment mainly through education.</p>
Feb 16, 2010	Mr. Joao Boavida @ Director of CEPAD	<p>Center of Studies for Peace and Development (CEPAD) is a non-governmental organization working in the area of peace building in Timor-Leste. The Director briefed about the findings of research done by CEPAD under Program of Research and Dialogue for Peace (PRDP). The followings were highlighted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The study was carried out adopting focus group discussions and regional conferences involving people from different walks of life. The objective of the study was to understand citizens' perception about what were the obstacles to peace

		<p>and development in Timor-Leste.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Four challenges to the peace and development were identified: deep-seated division among political leaders, cultural violence and impunity backed-up by politics, unemployment mainly of youths, and combating corruption. • The CEPAD Director opined that the fragile situation in Timor-Leste is the outcome of lack of proper handling of post-conflict situation. He viewed that the Timor-Leste rushed into political transition without proper institutions in place. Quick-fix is inevitable in emergency situation, but this approach does not work well in peace-building.
Feb 16, 2010	Meeting with Peace Building Working Group (Belun, CRS, IOM, PLAN and others)	<p>Timor-Leste has provision of Peace Building Working Group (PBWG) involving the non-governmental organizations. Ministry of Social and Solidarity is the focal point from the government which coordinates the PBWG activities. Several aspects of Timorese peace process and the works of PBWG were discussed. The followings were highlighted:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The major work being carried out by the NGOs is helping IDPs of 2006 violence get reintegrated into the society. For this they are running community stabilization program that includes community mediation, training of local leaders for conflict transformation, use of cultural ceremonies for reconciliation, and trust building activities. NGOs face several challenges in reintegration process, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ In addition to the issues of 2006 violence, they have to deal with the issues of past war with Indonesia, and even the issues before the Second World War. ➤ Success of reintegration depends on the interests of the communities. Sometimes they found that identification of the interest of communities that facilitate the process of reintegration was really difficult. The whole process of reintegration becomes particularly difficult when communities have vested interests in not allowing the IDPs to reintegrate. Some communities which have motive to occupy the land and property of IDPs resist the process of reintegration. • As for the issues of peace and development, the NGOs viewed that : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Lack of legal framework for dealing with the issues of land ownership has created a room for conflict whereby there are more than one claimant for the ownership of same land. ➤ Issue of impunity and corruption has gradually propelled the crisis of faith of people with the

		<p>government.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Unemployment of youths is emerging as a serious concern for consolidating peace in Timor-Leste. Proliferation of martial arts groups, which have their roots since Indonesian occupation, is the outcome of unemployment. Such groups are being used by the political parties for their short-term gains. Such groups can easily put fire on the straw and hence these are threats to the Timorese peace process. ➤ The most serious issue is lack of education. Uneducated mass can be easily driven by rumours. Political parties are using the uneducated mass as the tools for raising conflict.
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6 . Summary and Lessons Learned

1. The causes, actors, and history of conflict in Philippines and Timor-Leste differ with each other in many ways. Philippines faces two sets of problems: one cultural and the other socio-economic. The conflict in southern Philippines that has its roots mainly in culture and religion has a very long history and has claimed thousands of lives and internally displaced thousands of people since last four decades. The Muslims and indigenous people of southern Philippines are still in conflict with the GRP. As the peace process with MILF is ongoing, there is uncertainty as to whether this would be successfully concluded in near future. A lot will depend on the strategy to be adopted by the new President, for which the election is due in May, 2010. On the other hand, the conflict with CPP has its roots in the vast inequality that exists among rural and urban people on the social and economic dimensions. At the moment, peace talks with CPP has been halted and this poses serious threat to Philippine’s peace process.

Timor-Leste’s present conflict has its roots in the ever-widening differences between the political parties that were divided even during Indonesian occupation on the lines of ‘pro-independence’ and ‘pro-integration’. Timor-Leste’s peace process is seriously constrained by lack of appropriate institutions to undertake responsibilities of peace, security, and development. At the moment, peace in this country relies heavily on the international support, mainly the support from UN administration. Deep-seated division among political leaders, cultural violence and impunity backed-up by politicians, unemployment, and corruption stand as great challenges in Timor-Leste’s path to sustained peace.

2. Both the countries have learnt several lessons while implementing peace initiatives. Some of the followings are noteworthy and might be useful while formulating peace-building policies and implementing peace initiatives in Nepal.
- While implementing social integration program, the GRP had learnt that providing direct cash to the rebels was not an effective approach. The GRP is now planning to change the strategy and lend money to rebels against the government collateral, which they will utilize for enhancing their livelihoods through community-level cooperatives, in which the communities will also have stake.
 - Reflective Dialogue being adopted by GRP/OPAPP could be an effective tool for reconciliation and trust-building. NGOs can be used for community level dialogues for fostering environment of peace by providing more and more opportunities for talks between people.
 - Peace processes should not only focus on larger structural issues such as rights for autonomy or power sharing between center and province. These should equally focus on people to people and community to community relationships. There should be balance between centralized/national and local peace processes. Such balance could be achieved through the provision of local level peace structures. In Philippines, Peace and Development Communities and the Peace Zones have played instrumental role in reducing risks of violent conflict, monitoring the ceasefire agreements, and even carrying out developmental works. Learning from their lesson, Nepal should also strengthen Local Peace Committees (LPCs) for decentralizing and democratizing peace processes.
 - In Philippines, integration of rebels in the national army required a lot of planning and capacity building initiatives. So it was a time consuming process. The process was sensitive as well. Even after integration, disarmament was not fully achieved since splinter group from MNLF formed MILF with new armed rebel groups, with which the peace negotiations are still ongoing.
 - Consensus among political parties is the key to achieving desired outcomes from peace processes, particularly during the period of transition. In this regard, interesting similarities can be drawn from the experiences of Timor-Leste and Nepal.
 - The TRC process in Timor-Leste was done in hurry without legal framework to implement the recommendations. This has lead to frustrations among victims thus creating a fertile ground for future conflicts. Nepal has taken positive step by drafting the TRC bill and approving it from the parliament before starting TRC processes.
 - TRC process is very sensitive requiring expertise, adequate resources, and sufficient time. These aspects should be given due consideration in Nepal's

context. Nepal can also benefit a lot from the experiences of Timor-Leste with regards to implementing TRC provisions and documenting the proceedings.

- Experience from both the Philippines and Timor-Leste show that civil societies can play important role in reconciliation and reintegration of conflict-victims including the IDPs.
- While income inequality, exclusion, and historical discrimination were found as common causes of conflicts in both these countries, issues of youth unemployment and corruption have become the key concerns in protecting the achievements made so far in their peace processes.

Annexes:

- 1. Photographs**
- 2. Presentation by Dr. Steven Rood**
- 3. Presentation made in OPAPP office**
- 4. Presentation made in CCCH office**